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Abstract 
Why is there something rather than nothing? This paper explores one particular argument in favor of 
the answer that 'the existence of nothing' would amount to a logical contradiction. This argument 
consists of positing the existence of a novel entity, called a bion, of which all contingent things can be 
composed yet itself is non-contingent. First an overview of historical attempts to compile a 
systematic and exhaustive list of answers to the question is presented as context. Then follows an 
analysis of how the antropic principle would manifest itself in a world that consists of information 
and at the same time conforms to modal realism. Next, a thought experiment introduces bions as the 
foundation of such a world, showing how under these circumstances the ultimate origin of all 
existing things would be explained. The non-contingent nature of bions themselves is subsequently 
argued via a discussion of the principle of non-contradiction. Finally, this theory centered on the 
existence of bions is integrated into the worldview of Popperian metaphysics. According to the 
latter's criteria, I conclude that bion theory provides an integral answer to why there is something 
rather than nothing.         
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1 Introduction 
 
Why is there something rather than nothing? "There's no consensus, of course, regarding which 
proposed answer to [this question], if any, is correct, but occasionally there's also controversy 
regarding the meaning of the Question itself." (Brenner, 2016). According to Popper, philosophical 
questions typically tend not to have one specific interpretation that is generally accepted; "[...] for 
that there is no such thing is perhaps the one fact which is generally accepted." (Popper 2002:XVI).  
This paper presents a thought experiment the implications of which overlap with a wide array of 
historical answers to this question. And thereby this thought experiment elucidates how various 
existing interpretations of the question can be rearranged as interconnected elements of the same 
problem situation, and become integrated into a single explanatory narrative.  
Due to the broadness of this perspective, constraints on space prohibit a detailed discussion of every 
major existing approach towards answering why there is something rather than nothing. Instead, 
Chapter 2 develops a bird's-eye view of how the question has been interpreted and answered 
throughout its history, by focussing on the most influential historical attempts to compile a 
systematic and exhaustive list of possible answers (Sections 2.1 and 2.2).  
This sets the stage for the particular answer which I suggest in this paper, as this answer combines 
elements from various schools of thought in a multi-layered framework. More specifically, my 
approach is based on elucidating how existing attempts to address the question from the areas of 
information theory, cosmology, epistemology and ontology, can be unified into a single explanation. 
The point at which these areas converge, or in other words: the concept which (in the context of this 
answer) links these areas together, consists of a novel idea which I call bions.  
Bions constitute highly abstract entities, the precise nature of which is best understood by first 
examining the context in which I envisage them to play their explanatory role. The first step in 
introducing this context, is Section 2.3, which discusses the possibility that the question Why is there 
everything rather than nothing? more accurately describes the ultimate origin of the world than does 
the question Why is there something rather than nothing? The final two sections of that chapter 
further explore this idea via a discussion of modal realism and the anthropic principle respectively.  
Chapter 3 combines these two concepts by asking how the anthropic principle would manifest itself 
in a multiverse composed of information. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 go into the nature of information 
itself. The third section raises the question of in what kind of medium bits (i.e. binary digits) could be 
arranged outside of the context of spacetime. At this point, via a long thought experiment spread out 
over Sections 3.4 through 3.8, bions are introduced as a bit-like entity designed to answer how 
information can indeed exist outside of spacetime.   
Chapter 4 explains why this bit-like entity itself exists. The first section briefly discusses the notion of 
'explanation existing in multiple layers', and how a superficial interpretation of the question of Why 
is there something rather than nothing? is answered by the theory presented in the paper thus far. 
The second section introduces another brief thought experiment, and shows how this - in 
conjunction with the principle of non-contradiction - answers a somewhat deeper version of the 
question. Section 4.3 expands on this, arguing that this line of reasoning implies that the non-
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existence of 'something' would simply constitute a logical contradiction, and that this ultimately 
explains why there isn't 'nothing' instead. Section 4.4 shows how this answer fits into the framework 
of one existing taxonomy of possible responses to the question of why there is anything at all.    
Chapter 5 investigates the implications of the theory presented in the previous chapters. It does so 
from the reference point of Popper's criteria of what explanation means. Specifically, the four 
sections of this chapter discuss Popper's notion of metaphysics and analyze how the subject of this 
paper relates to that interpretation of metaphysics.  
Lastly, Chapter 6 recapitulates the stages of my answer to why something rather than nothing exists, 
working in the reverse order of the rest of the paper so as to explore stressing alternate emphases. 
This final chapter ends with a conclusion (Section 6.2) to the theory presented in this paper.   
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2 Background to the question 
 
2.1 Why is there something rather than nothing? The meaning and validity of this question have 
been the subject of controversy throughout its history. Its modern formulation is attributed to 
Leibniz, who in 1714 wrote that "[...] nothing happens without it being possible for someone who 
knows enough things to give a reason sufficient to determine why it is so and not otherwise. 
Assuming this principle, the first question we have the right to ask will be, why is there something 
rather than nothing? For nothing is easier and simpler than something." (Holt 2012:20; Leslie & Kuhn 
2013:13)  
In ancient Greeks philosophy, by contrast, the world was thought to have begun with a state of 
complete randomness somehow becoming arranged into 'a world with a more specific structure', 
rather than the world beginning with nothing at all (Holt 2012:19). Anaximander, arguably the first 
known Greek philosopher and founder of metaphysics, speculated around the sixth century BCE that 
everything that exists comes from a substance which he calls 'the Boundless', i.e. "[...] that which has 
no boundaries". According to Aristotle, the argument underlying the idea of 'the Boundless as 
ultimate origin' can be phrased as: "The Boundless has no origin. For then it would have a limit." 
(Couprie 2003)   
Aristotle, who lived in the fourth century BCE, also compiled the first systematic overview of the 
forms a chain of explanations can take. First, it can be circular: "A is true because B, and B is true 
because A." The second option is that the chain of explanations is infinite, so that it has no final 
element that itself remains unexplained. The third and final possibility is that the chain is finite, 
either because the final element in the chain somehow doesn't require an explanation, or because 
that final element is of such a nature that its nonexistence would constitute a logical contradiction.  
(Holt 2012:131-2. Section 4.3 returns to this list) 
Starting in the second or third century CE, it was proclaimed within the Christian church that "The 
notion that God needed some sort of stuff to fashion a world seemed to put a limit on his 
presumably infinite creative powers. [Therefore there couldn't have been] any preexisting material 
to make it out of." (Holt 2012:19,20) In other words, in this view God must have created the world 
out of nothing due to the very nature of what God is. Krauss remarks in this regard that for many 
people with whom he tries to debate the question of why there is something rather than nothing, 
the notion "[...] that from which only God can create something" is in fact the only definition of the 
term 'nothing' that they are willing to accept (Krauss 2012:XV).  
When Leibniz later on fashioned the question into its modern form, he too stated that the existence 
of the world is contingent, whereas the nonexistence of God would amount to a logical 
contradiction. Hume and Kant, writing in the 18th century soon after Leibniz, disagreed with the 
latter's position. They asserted that, although the existence of some entities is logically impossible 
(e.g. a square circle), it's never the case that the nonexistence of an entity or being could qualify as a 
logical contradiction, so postulating a God would not resolve the matter. If they are right, however, 
the possibility of the existence of nothing could not be ruled out by logic alone either, so we'd still 
require some other answer as to why there is something instead of nothing. (Holt 2012:21)     
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2.2 Over the years, many possible answers have been given to this question. Rescher (1984) classifies 
these various responses as follows:  
"An inventory of possible responses to the question: "Why is there anything at all? 
  I.   The question is illegitimate and improper. [Rejectionism] 
  II.  The question is legitimate 
 (1) but unanswerable: it represents a mystery. [Mystificationism] 
 (2) and answerable 
      (a) though only by the via negativa of an insistence that there really is no "answer" in the 
             ordinary sense - no sort of explanatory rationale at all. The existence of things in the 
             world is simply a brute fact. [The no-reason approach.] 
      (b) via a substantival route of roughly the following sort: "There is a substance [viz. God] 
            whose position in the scheme of things is one that lies outside the world, and whose 
            activity explains the existence of things in the world." [The theological approach.] 
      (c) via a nonsubstantival route of roughly the following sort: "There is a principle of                   
            creativity that obtains in abstracto (i.e., without being embedded in the characteristics 
           of any substance and thus without a basis in any preexisting thing), and the operation 
           of this principle accounts for the existence of things." [The nomological approach.] 
      (d) via the quasi-logical route of considerations of absolute necessity. [The necessitarian 
            approach.]" (Leslie & Kuhn 2013:16. Section 4.3 returns to this list) 
Kuhn has devised a still more extensive classification of responses to this same question, featuring 27 
options divided into four main categories (namely One Universe Models, Multiple Universe Models, 
Nonphysical Causes, and Illusions). Part of that categorization will be examined in more detail later 
on in this paper (Section 4.4). For now, the focus will be on a separate - but closely related - list 
compiled by Kuhn, concerning the various possible interpretations of what it would mean for a state 
of affairs to comprise the existence of nothing. 
"This taxonomy is structured as [...] a progressive reduction of the content of each Nothing in a 
hierarchy of Nothings. As such, this taxonomy takes its heritage from the so-called Subtraction 
Argument, which seeks to show that the absence of all concrete objects would be metaphysically 
possible." (Leslie & Kuhn 2013:259) The Subtraction Argument was coined by Baldwin in 1996, and 
consists of three premises: "(A1) There might be a world with a finite domain of concrete objects. 
(A2) These objects are, each of them, things which might not exist. (A3) The non-existence of any of 
these things does not necessitate the existence of any other such thing." (Lowe 2002:63)  
Kuhn continues that "My point here is not so much to argue the legitimacy of any one kind of 
Nothing but rather to construct an exhaustive taxonomy of all potential or competing Nothings [...]" 
These nine levels of Nothings are:  
"(1) Nothing as existing space and time that just happens to be totally empty of all visible objects 
(particles and energy are permitted - an utterly simplistic view). 
  (2) Nothing as existing space and time that just happens to be totally empty of all matter (no 
particles, but energy is permitted - flouting the law of mass-energy equivalence). 
  (3) Nothing as existing space and time that just happens to be totally empty of all matter and 
energy. 
  (4) Nothing as existing space and time that is by necessity irremediably and permanently in all 
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directions, temporal as well as spatial - totally empty of all matter and energy. 
  (5) Nothing of the kind found in some theoretical formulations by physicists, where, although space-
time (unified) as well as mass-energy (unified) do not exist, pre-existing laws, particularly laws of 
quantum mechanics, do exist. And it is these laws that somehow make it the case that universes can 
and do, from time to time, pop into existence from "Nothing," creating space-time as well as mass-
energy. (It is standard physics to assume that empty space must seethe with virtual particles, a 
consequence of the uncertainty principle of quantum physics, where particle-antiparticle pairs come 
into being and then, in a fleetingly brief moment, annihilate each other.) 
  (6) Nothing where not only there are no space-time and no mass-energy, but also there are no pre-
existing laws of physics that could generate space-time of mass-energy (universes). 
  (7) Nothing where not only there are no space-time, no mass-energy and no pre-existing laws of 
physics, but also there are no non-physical things or kinds that are concrete (rather than abstract) - 
no God, no gods, and no consciousness (cosmic or otherwise). This means that there are no physical 
or non-physical beings or existents of any kind - nothing, whether natural or supernatural, that is 
concrete (rather than abstract). 
  (8) Nothing where not only there are none of the above (so that, as in Nothing 7, there are no 
concrete existing things, physical or non-physical), but also there are no abstract objects of any kind - 
no numbers, no sets, no logic, no general propositions, no universals, no Platonic forms (perhaps no 
value). 
  (9) Nothing where not only there are none of the above (so that, as in Nothing 8, there are no 
abstract objects), but also there are no possibilities of any kind (recognizing that possibilities and 
abstract objects overlap, though allowing that they can be distinguished)." (Leslie & Kuhn 2013:259-
60)   
"Nothings One through Seven progressively remove or eliminate existing things." Kuhn considers 
Nothing Seven the most meaningful metaphysical definition of nothing , as it already "[...] features 
no concrete existing things (no physical or non-physical concrete existents) of any kind. Nothings 
Eight and Nine go further, eliminating non-concrete objects, things, existents and realities. Do they go 
too far? Many philosophers assert that the claimed absence of abstract objects and/or possibilities 
would constitute a logical contradiction and hence abstract objects and/or possibilities exist 
necessarily." (idem:260) 
2.3 In addition to both the history of the question of why there is something rather than nothing and 
to taxonomies of its currently existing array of possible answers, another starting point for 
addressing it is to split it into multiple constituent questions. For instance, distinguishing between 
'Why is there one specific something instead of a different specific something?' on the one hand and 
'Why is there anything at all?' on the other.  
It may be objected that the latter is more fundamental than the former, since it would seem that first 
one specific something must come into existence before a second something (i.e. something else) 
can be added to it. And that 'Why is there one specific something instead of a different specific 
something?' is therefore not a constituent of the question 'Why is there is something rather than 
nothing?', but rather a separate question. However, that reasoning is based on the assumption that 
one thing is always simpler than multiple things, and that generating one thing is always easier than 
generating multiple things. (Note the analogy to Leibniz's above mentioned assertion that nothing is 
easier and simpler than something).  
 
 
7 
 
Contrary to that assumption, the ideas in the next section (Section 2.4) imply that it may be simpler 
and easier to explain 'Why there (initially) is everything rather than nothing', and subsequently 
explain 'Why our universe consists of only some things rather than (still) consisting of everything', 
then it would be to explain 'Why there is something rather than nothing' via any other route. Which 
casts doubt on Leibniz's assertion that the question he has formulated addresses the ultimate origin 
of the world (in his above mentioned words: "[it's] the first question we have the right to ask."):  The 
next section suggests that there may be a question (viz. Why is there everything rather than 
nothing?) that even more directly describes the most elementary relation between nothing and the 
world than Leibniz's question does, because it suggests that the existence of 'every thing' may 
precede the existence of 'only some things' in the chain of explanations comprising the world's 
origin.  
2.4 Lewis (1986) believes that everything that can exist, does exist, and coined the term modal 
realism to describe this philosophical position. Lewis: "I advocate a thesis of plurality of worlds, or 
modal realism, which holds that our world is but one world among many. [...] There are so many 
other worlds, in fact, that absolutely every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some 
world is. [Our world] is the actual world; the rest are not actual. Why so? - I take it to be a trivial 
matter of meaning. I use the word "actual" to mean the same as "this worldly". When I use it, it 
applies to my world and my worldmates; to this world we are part of, and to all parts of this world 
[...] This makes actuality a relative matter: every world is actual at itself, and thereby all worlds are 
on a par [...]" (Leslie & Kuhn 2013:26-8)  
Nozick (1981) proposes a similar notion: "All the possibilities exist in independent noninteracting 
realms, in "parallel universes". We might call this the fecundity assumption. It appears that only such 
an egalitarian view does not leave any question "why X rather than Y?" unanswered. [...] As an 
ultimate and very deep principle, the principle of fecundity can subsume itself within a deductive 
explanation. It states that all possibilities are realized, while itself is one of those possibilities [...]" 
(Leslie & Kuhn 2013:244).      
Modal realism and the principle of fecundity are extreme forms of what in physics is known as a 
multiverse. "[...] many of the major developments in fundamental theoretical physics [...] have led us 
to consider one or other variety of parallel universe. [Each of these theories] envisions our universe 
as part of an unexpected larger whole [...]" (Greene 2011:5). "A new word, multiverse, has been 
coined to denote physical reality as a whole." (Deutsch 1998:46) The most expansive universe that 
could possibly exist, viz. one that contains every conceivable universe, Greene calls the Ultimate 
Multiverse. (Greene 2011:338) Tegmark orders the different multiverses of physics into "[...] a nested 
four-level hierarchy of increasing diversity [...]". The fourth and most expansive one of these, the 
Level IV multiverse, comprises all possible mathematical structures, and he argues that all those 
mathematical structures exist physically as well. (2015:357)  
Tegmark (2003) points out a common criticism of multiverse theories; that they seemingly defy 
Occam's razor (Leslie & Kuhn 2013:205). This is a fourteenth century theoretical principle which has 
an axiomatic status in modern science, and which states that all else being equal, the simplest of two 
alternative explanations is the correct one. Since a multiverse theory claims that there exist more 
things than classical theories of there being only one universe do, can we conclude that a universe is 
simpler than a multiverse? The answer strongly depends on which interpretation of complexity is 
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employed. Lloyd distinguishes between forty-two kinds of complexity, each measured in a different 
way. The first category of measures of complexity he mentions deals with measures "[...] of how hard 
it is to describe something [...]". One of the measures in that category is called algorithmic 
information. (2007:189). Tegmark: "[The argument of Occam's razor] can be turned around to argue 
for a multiverse. [A]n entire ensemble is often much simpler than one of its members. This principle 
can be stated more formally using the notion of algorithmic information content." (Leslie & Kuhn 
2013:206) The algorithmic complexity of a specific number or of a specific string of bits (binary digits) 
of information is defined as the length of the shortest computer program that would produce that 
number or that string of bits. (ibidem; Tegmark 2015:327)  
An example which illustrates this in a more intuitive way is that it is harder to remember the specific 
number 64825875526984532158472002360 than it is to remember the number 
1234567891011121314151617181920; although both numbers are equal in length, the latter can be 
succinctly described as 'all integers from 1 to 20' whereas the former contains no discernible pattern 
that allows it to be specified by any description with less characters than the original sequence 
contains. Likewise, any specific something, such as an apple with its many defining properties such as 
having a particular location in space, a position in time at which it exists, a specific size, a color, and 
so on, can be thought of as having a higher algorithmic complexity content than a concept like 
'everything that logically can exist, does exist'. It is in that sense that 'everything' can be considered 
simpler than 'something'.  
Is taking the route of first explaining 'why there initially was everything rather than nothing' and 
subsequently explaining 'why there is now something rather than still everything' also easier than 
explaining 'why there is something rather than nothing' directly? A definitive answer to that question 
in turn of course depends on the specifics of what answer, if any, each of these approaches yield. 
Nevertheless, a case can be made for the assertion that, as philosophical conundrums go, the 
problem of 'Why is there now something rather than still everything?' is a remarkably easy one to 
solve. This solution I'm referring to is the anthropic principle.   
2.5 Many physical constants in nature would, if they had been even slightly different, never have 
given rise to the kind of universe that we inhabit nor presumably to any kind of universe capable of 
supporting anything remotely resembling life (Tegmark 2015). In other words, the laws of physics 
seem 'fine-tuned' to the task of enabling the existence of living, thinking entities such as ourselves 
which observe the existence of those laws and even observe that they are observers (i.e. who seem 
to be conscious). Is this apparent fine-tuning a coincidence?  
Carter (1973) came up with the phrase anthropic principle with regard to this issue. This concept 
comprises two variants; the weak form and the strong form. "As originally defined by Brandon 
Carter, the Weak Anthropic Principle stated the fact, utterly obvious yet overlooked by many 
cosmologists, that our neck of the cosmic woods must (since we're in it) be capable of containing 
observers such as ourselves. Carter's Strong Anthropic Principle then made the equally obvious, 
equally often overlooked point that the cosmos must be capable of containing such observers 
somewhere, sometime. Must, that's to say, since we're in it, observing it. Just as a burglar must have 
paid a visit since your Picasso has disappeared. No suggestion that the burglar had been forced to 
visit you, or that God forced the universe to be life-permitting. [T]he explanation of any fine-tuning 
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could instead be that there exist multiple universes with varying properties." (Leslie & Kuhn 
2013:216-7)   
The universes which a multiverse consists of can be thought of as realms that have almost no 
interaction with each other. In Deutsch's conception of the multiverse (which corresponds to 
Tegmark's Level III multiverse, both of which are based on Everett's 1957 theory that the 
wavefunction of a quantum system never collapses), for example, parallel universes are noticeable 
only through their quantum interference with our universe. (Deutsch 1998:53;Tegmark 2015:186) 
Existence, then, takes on several forms: In this multiverse view all the things that interact within - 
and compose - our universe (apart from quantum interference phenomena), are merely a special 
case within the larger framework of all things that exist in the multiverse as a whole. Furthermore, if 
this particular multiverse is in turn part of an overarching world in which every logical possibility is 
realized somewhere (modal realism, the ultimate universe, Tegmark's Level IV multiverse), then 
everything exists somewhere, even though our experience is almost entirely confined to the specific 
somethings of our universe.  
Note that the term somewhere is used metaphorically in this context, referring not necessarily to a 
location in space in the classical sense, since the particular spatial dimensions of our universe don't 
extend into the parallel universes (other than those classified under the Level I multiverse in 
Tegmark's taxonomy) where most things in the ultimate multiverse are 'located'.  
Modal realisms suggests a world which (although taking in mind this caveat of location as metaphor) 
is more accurately described as 'everything exists but only something exists here' than as 'everything 
used to exist but only something exists now'. And the reason why here in our universe it seems that 
there only exist some things rather than everything, is explained by the anthropic principle: We find 
ourselves in a corner of the multiverse where only those specific things interact which by their 
particular nature compose us and our environment, rather than also containing other things (e.g. 
additional laws of physics, more matter per unit of volume of space, or an extra digit inserted into 
the number describing the value of the cosmological constant) that through their interaction with the 
actual contents of our universe would have precluded the possibility for life capable of observing its 
existence to form. 
In order to get to the answer which this paper proposes for the remaining question of why there is 
everything rather than nothing, first one particular kind of ultimate multiverse needs to be looked 
into: One made up entirely of information. The next chapter examines how the anthropic principle 
manifests itself in such a world, via a thought experiment.   
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3 The anthropic principle in a multiverse composed of information 
 
3.1 What is information? "Just like the word 'letter', which refers not only to a written message, but 
also to the alphabetical symbols that compose it, the word 'information' has two different senses. 
The colloquial usage, as in 'personal information' and 'directory information', refers to the meaning 
of a message of some sort. The technical sense, on the other hand, emphasizes the symbols used to 
transmit a message, whether they are letters, numbers or just the computer digits zero and one. 
[T]he two connotations of 'information' are closely intertwined. The meaning of a message arises out 
of the relationship of the individual symbols that make it up, just as the meaning of a letter emerges 
from the particular juxtaposition of its letters [...]". (Baeyer 2004:18-9) What, then is the nature of 
symbols themselves? Their own meaning can also be thought of as defined by the relationships that 
hold between them. The mathematician Poincaré wrote that science is not about investigating "[...] 
things in themselves, [...] but the relations between things; outside those relations there is no reality 
knowable." The philosopher Wittgenstein stated that "We cannot think of any object apart from the 
possibility of its connections with other things." Baeyer goes on that "[I]t is impossible to define 
anything without first defining other things." (idem:24)  
Similarly Tegmark, in elucidating his hypothesis that the world is made up of mathematics, remarks 
that : "[...] we live in a relational reality, in the sense that the properties of the world around us stem 
not from properties of its ultimate building blocks, but from the relations between these building 
blocks. [...] Our brain may provide another example[:] particular firing patterns in different groups of 
neurons correspond to different concepts. The main difference between [concepts lies not] in the 
type of neurons involved, but in their relations (connections) to other neurons." (2015:267)        
Information in Baeyer's view, is the transfer of a specific pattern of relationships from one medium 
into another medium. For example from the page of a book to the network of neural activity in the 
brain, or the sound waves of a musical instrument via a microphone into a computer. The network of 
relationships is expressed differently in one medium than in another medium, hence its transfer 
between media is a form of translation. By consistently applying the same translation key of which 
unit of information in one medium corresponds (by convention) to which unit of information in 
another medium, a message gets communicated as intended. Such a dictionary of what in one 
medium corresponds to what in another, is called a code. The process of transferring information is 
called coding. And although coding is a process, information can be depicted as a static phenomenon 
in the sense that "[...] a changing pattern can be recorded as a graph in which time is presented by 
distance along the horizontal axis." (2004:25-6) 
3.2 Shannon, the founder of information theory, has shown that binary code is the most efficient tool 
for coding (idem:31). A binary digit, or bit for short, "[...] is the smallest unit of information." The 
word binary "[...] means consisting of two parts, and a bit represents one of these two alternatives. 
Traditionally, these alternatives are referred to as 0 and 1, but any two distinct alternatives (hot/cold, 
black/white, in/out) register a bit." (Lloyd 2007:18)  
Binary code is the language typically used by modern computers. In the 1930's mathematical 
research by Turing and Church laid the theoretical foundations that would give rise to computers as 
we now know them. Their work suggests that "There exists an abstract universal computer whose 
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repertoire includes any computation that any physically possible object can perform." Penrose has 
named this idea 'the Turing principle'. Finishing a vast amount of calculations might take a computer 
a long time and a lot of memory capacity. But according to the Turing principle, if you wait long 
enough and install enough memory, each computer can do everything that any other computer could 
ever do. (Deutsch 1998:131-5) 
Deutsch further argues that the implications of the Turing principle extend to the claim that "It is 
possible to build a virtual-reality generator whose repertoire includes every physically possible 
environment. [...] If the laws of physics as they apply to any physical object or process are to be 
comprehensible, they must be capable of being embodied in another physical object - the knower. It 
is also necessary that processes capable of creating such knowledge be physically possible. Such 
processes are called science. Science depends on experimental testing, which means physically 
rendering [i.e. making a mental image of] a law's predictions and comparing it with (a rendering of) 
reality. It also depends on explanation, and that requires the abstract laws themselves, not merely 
their predictive content, to be capable of being rendered in virtual reality. [...] The laws of physics, by 
conforming to the Turing principle, make it physically possible for those same laws to become known 
to physical objects. Thus, the laws of physics may be said to mandate their own comprehensibility. 
Since building a universal virtual-reality generator is physically possible, it must actually be built in 
some universes." (ibidem)  
Thus, by the logic of the anthropic principle, a being capable of making a mental image (i.e. a virtual-
reality rendering) of the world, which is what it means to be an observer, will self-evidently live in 
one of the universes where the Turing principle applies. In fact, as Deutsch hints at here, the 
anthropic principle is the reason why our universe has the particular laws of physics which ensure 
that the Turing principle applies in it. 
If it's possible for the world (whether a universe or a multiverse) in all its aspects to be simulated in 
the form of virtual-reality, then that suggests the world is, at its most fundamental level, information. 
Information such as a string of binary digits, for instance 001001101001110. Although the string 
viewed as a whole is static, it can be an encoded description of one or more spacetimes. And from 
the view of people living in - and as part of - a spacetime, such as we according to the general theory 
of relativity, history unfolds as the process of successive changes occurring over time (Deutsch 
1998:268). The next section addresses one particular problem with the idea that the world as a 
whole is a string of bits.   
3.3 What makes it possible for us to talk of bits possessing any specific order in a sequence, is that 
you and I live in the same context, viz. this universe, and thereby share a frame of reference relative 
to which notions like an order or a sequence are meaningful. For us to read the words on this page in 
the same sequence, the sole requirement is to follow the conventional 'code' of going from left to 
right in each line, because we are located in the same spatial environment. Likewise, if I read them 
aloud, you will hear them in the same order in which I recite them since we also inhabit the same 
timeline.  
But if space and time are internal to a universe, how can the information describing a universe or a 
multitude of universes have a location in space or a moment in time? This is a paradox; if space is 
made up of information, there would first have to be information before there is space, but 
information needs to have an order in space before it can make up anything more complex than one 
 
 
12 
 
single bit. Thus lacking a specifiable frame of reference, in what sense do the bits in a string 
composing the multiverse still have an order or a sequence? To think there can be a string of bits 
outside the universe may be a case of extrapolating 'properties of our neck of the woods' beyond 
their range of applicability.       
We can take this argument one step further and ask in what sense there can be a multitude of bits? 
There by definition do exist two distinct bits; a bit with the logical value 0 and a bit with the 
alternative possibility, 1. But in what way are 0 and 0 distinct 'in a situation where there is no such 
thing as distinct spatial locations for them to occupy', unlike on this page? Same thing of course goes 
for 1 and 1. And two bits do not suffice to represent the complexity (e.g. the required algorithmic 
information content) of any significant part of the universe. Nor are two bits enough, I presume, to 
represent the complexity of a statement like 'everything that logically can exist, does exist'.  
In conclusion, I think a multiverse consisting of bits would only be logically possible if it does have a 
structure which enables the potential for bits to be ordered in some way, thus giving rise to multiple 
distinct bits and thereby accumulating complexity, yet this structure can't be anything concrete like, 
for instance, space. The next section presents such a structure.  
3.4 "Why is there something rather than nothing? The question appears impossible to answer. Any 
factor introduced to explain why there is something will itself be part of the something to be 
explained, so it (or anything utilizing it) could not explain all of the something - it could not explain 
why there is anything at all. Explanation proceeds by explaining some things in terms of others, but 
this question seems to preclude introducing anything else, any explanatory factors. [...] The question 
cuts so deep [...] that any approach that stands a chance of yielding an answer will look extremely 
weird. Someone who proposes a non-strange answer shows he didn't understand this question. 
Since the question is not to be rejected, though, we must be prepared to accept strangeness or 
apparent craziness in a theory that answers it." This is how Nozick expressed his view of what an 
answer to 'why there is something rather than nothing' would look like. (Leslie & Kuhn 2013:238) 
The answer I propose starts with the thought experiment of visualizing a binary digit as two distinct 
alternatives, 0 and 1, with a relation between them. In the figure below this relation is represented 
by a horizontal line.  
 
Figure 1: Visual representation of two binary alternatives and the relation between them, with two 
different symbols (0 and 1) for these alternatives. 
Things can have many relations between them; one thing can be bigger than something else, denser, 
less fragile, and so on. What relations are there between the two alternatives that make up a binary 
digit? The relation that expresses they are distinct. And that is the only relation which holds between 
them. This last fact is difficult to picture, because, for instance, even in a simple representation such 
as the above figure the symbols 0 and 1 have different locations on this page, which constitutes 
another distinction - and thus also another relation - between them. And as another example, the 
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number 1 has the property that multiplying it by any number (except itself) yields a value different 
from itself, whereas the number 0 lacks that property since multiplying 0 always produces 0.  Which 
is yet another distinction between the number 0 and the number 1. 
But despite us using symbols which in other contexts have more properties (i.e. are more complex 
than having only one relation) than the two parts of a bit are supposed to have, the two parts of a bit 
are in principle supposed to be absolutely abstract entities, not concrete and complex things like 
apples. And the only thing that they, by themselves, are supposed to express is that they are distinct. 
(Any other property a priori ascribed to them infuses them with additional specific meaning and 
thereby reduces their neutrality and their universality: If they would individually express additional 
information they would lose their potential of 'efficiently conveying any desired specific message 
through the order in which bits are presented in a sequence' because no sequence of these bits could 
ever not express any of the information expressed by the individual bit).  
The above figure is therefore quite redundant; it states the message of there being two alternatives 
four times: First by using the distinct symbols 0 and 1. Second, by calling them alternatives. Third, by 
these symbols occupying different locations in space. Fourth, by mentioning that they have a relation 
which expresses they are distinct. A bit is so simple that it's hard to give a description that isn't more 
complex than what's intended to be described. I'll now move on to a portrayal more fitting to a bit's 
simplicity, by replacing the 0 and the 1 with circles that appear identical in a visual image. The circles 
don't express identical entities here however, since them being distinct is still expressed by their 
context, viz. the accompanying words 'alternative 1' and 'alternative 2', the distinct locations in space 
of these circles, and the term 'relation' which again expresses their distinctness in words.  
 
Figure 2: Visual representation of two binary alternatives and the relation between them, with the 
same symbols for these two alternatives. That they are distinct is here no longer expressed by 
symbols such as 0 and 1 but is still expressed by context (viz. by their distinct spatial positions on this 
page and by the accompanying words). 
The next figure takes this one step further and omits all the words in the image. The horizontal line 
still symbolizes a relation expressing their distinctness.  
 
Figure 3: Wordless visual representation of two binary alternatives and the relation between them. 
That they are distinct is still expressed by there being a symbol for 'relation' between them and by 
their distinct spatial position on this page.     
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This figure (Figure 3) is the most elementary depiction of a bit I shall represent. It symbolizes the 
simplicity of a bit, namely that the only property of each alternative in a bit is that they are distinct. 
In the next section I present an entity related to bits. 
3.5 Imagine, again, a bit. But this time change one thing in this thought experiment: In addition to 
each alternative in a bit having the property that they are distinct, add one more property: The 
property that each alternative in this 'bit', is itself also such a kind of bit. This yields the following 
picture: 
 
Figure 4: Visual representation of a bit-like concept in which each alternative is itself like a bit. 
Now imagine that each of the alternatives in those two new 'bits' are in turn also 'bits' themselves. 
And so on, ad infinitum. Likewise, imagine that the bit we started from (viz. the one composed of the 
largest circles in Figure 4) is itself one of the alternatives in an encompassing 'bit', and so on, so that 
this nested string of 'bits' is now infinite in both directions. Of course an infinite amount of bits (of 
any kind) can't be portrayed on a page of finite size, so a depiction of this infinite sequence of nested 
entities always starts at a random point and ends where entities would become too small to be 
clearly visible. But these practical constraints are a feature of the depiction only, not a feature of the 
nature of this abstract entity itself.   
    
Figure 5: Another visual representation of a finite piece of an infinite nested sequence of bit-like 
concepts. 
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I call such a bit-like thing a binary distinction, or bion for short. (Abbreviated as a contraction of the 
beginning of the first word and the end of the last word, in analogy to how binary digit is shortened 
to bit). A bion expresses that the two entities which it contains (and which it, along with its third and 
final component, viz. the relation between those two entities, comprises), are distinct, just like a bit 
does. There are two differences between bions and bits however. The first is somewhat trivial; that 
the name differs. 'Bits' is a term originating in the context of computation, where they designate one 
specific category of the standard ingredients of calculation, namely numerical symbols or 
synonymously 'digits'. Computation is something we engage in inside our universe, in which the 
existence of things like space and time are a given. The concept of a bion by contrast, refers to the 
abstract and fundamental property it shares with a bit, viz. that of being a distinction between two 
otherwise identical things. A bion is meant to be thought of as context-independent; as an abstract 
thing not necessarily located inside some pre-existing space and not necessarily constituting a unit of 
computation. The reason bions can be context-independent in this way, arises, as I will argue in this 
paper, from the second and more substantial way in which bions differ from bits: That in the case of 
each bion, by definition, each of the two entities which along with the relation between them 
comprise that bion, itself comprises another bion. (And conversely, that literally every bion is itself 
one of the two entities that comprise yet another bion).  
 
Figure 6: Visual representation of a finite piece of the infinite sequence a bion is always part of, in 
which the bions are numbered. The numbering here starts with the number 1. 
Figure 6 is somewhat misleading, in that it may appear like the sequence of bions (in referring to a 
connected collection of bions, I use the terms sequence, series, string and web interchangeably) has a 
beginning, namely bion 1. Since the sequence of bions, however, is infinite, any starting point chosen 
to start numbering from is arbitrary. They might as well be numbered, for instance, as they are in 
Figure 7: 
  
Figure 7: Visual representation of a finite piece of the infinite sequence that a bion is always part of, 
in which the bions are numbered. The 'numbering' system chosen here is alphabetical and starts 
randomly with the letter e. 
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This concludes the first halve of the thought experiment. The next sections elaborates on the nature 
of bions, starting with a brief discussion of what relations are. 
3.6 Kaipayil writes that "The identity of an entity is defined by its relations. These relations include 
the entity's intra-relations (relations among its constitutive elements) and inter-relations (relations 
with other entities)." Conversely, the identity of a relation is defined by the entities between which it 
exists. "If entities disappear, relations also will disappear." He continues with a definition of the 
philosophical positions of relationism and relativism: "Relationism holds that what ultimately exists 
are relations and that reality is the totality of relations. [...] Relativism is the view that reality comes 
to us unsorted and that it is the cognitive subject that arranges the furniture of the world[.]" (2009:8-
10)  
Bions are an extremely homogenous infinite web of relations arranged in a nested structure. Do 
entities exist in that structure? The answer is subtle. Every entity in this web of bions constitutes a 
relation in the next level of its nested structure. (Or more precisely: Every entity in this web of bions 
constitutes a relation plus two entities in the next level of its nested structure, and the same thing in 
turn goes for those two entities, ad infinitum). So bions are a special case in which the two (in most 
contexts mutually exclusive) categories of entity and relation form a false dichotomy. (cfr. ontic 
structural realism).   
Could the ultimate multiverse at its most fundamental level be the infinite nested string of bions? In 
this paper I argue that this is a possibility (and that this yields a candidate solution to why there is 
something rather than nothing). And according to the above definition; 'what ultimately exists are 
relations and reality is the totality of relations', this view can furthermore be classified under the 
view known as relationism.  
The notion of the ultimate multiverse being bions also overlaps with Tegmark's notion of a Level IV 
multiverse: Recall that Tegmark asserts that we live in what he calls 'a relational reality'. His Level IV 
multiverse consists of mathematical structures, and he defines a mathematical structure as a "Set of 
abstract entities with relations between them [...]". He further mentions that "Two descriptions of 
mathematical structures are equivalent if there's a correspondence between them that preserves all 
relations [...]". (2015:267, cfr. Baeyer's definition of information) One of the mathematical structures 
which Tegmark presents as a candidate for the structure of the Level IV multiverse is a fractal 
(2015:322). What it means for a structure to be a fractal, or synonymously what it means for a 
structure to be scale-invariant or self-similar, is that when you take an image of it and magnify it (e.g. 
zoom in on it), the magnified piece of the image looks similar to the original image.    
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Figure 8: Example of a fractal. 
Bions form a fractal. In fact, they exhibit a perfect form of scale-invariance, since each bion looks not 
only similar but identical to the other bions, thus retaining full homogeneity on every level of its 
nested structure. Arguably, bions are also the simplest possible structure that can qualify as a fractal, 
in that each level of the sequence of bions (i.e. each bion) contains the minimum number of 
relations; one, and the minimum number of 'entities' that a relation can be between; two.     
Another, albeit less direct, philosophical analogy to the structure of bions, is found in the structure of 
Hegelian dialectics: Two distinct and opposing things together form a third thing, which in turn 
combines with the thing that opposes itself to together form a fifth thing, in an endlessly repeating 
process. 
 
Figure 9: The core idea of Hegelian dialectics expressed through the symbols which this paper uses for 
bions. 
This concludes the topic of describing the nature of bions directly. The next section further elucidates 
the nature of bions via examining one of their implications: The link of how something as abstract 
and simple as bions could yield the concrete existence of something as specific and complex as our 
universe. 
3.7 Whereas a multiverse composed of a string of bits would be a paradox (since there would first 
have to exist a medium such as space for those bits 'to be arranged in a specific order in' before the 
bits could describe - and thereby yield the existence of - something as complex as a medium such as 
space, see section 3.3), I will argue in this section that this problem can be circumvented in the case 
of bions. Here we enter into the second halve of the thought experiment. 
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Say one bion exists. The existence of one bion necessitates the existence of an infinite amount of 
bions. This is because no part of a bion constitutes a self-contained whole, but rather derives its 
meaning from its relation to the next bion and that one derives its meaning from its relation to yet 
the next bion and so on. (Why one bion exists instead of nothing is the subject of the next chapter, 
but for the purposes of this thought experiment we'll treat it as a given). How does the anthropic 
principle manifest itself in a multiverse of bions? 
First we'll visualize the more familiar notion of a string of bits, e.g. 0010111001001001010101. If this 
string is long and random enough (or infinite and random), then every particular juxtaposition of bits 
that we can conceive of will occur in it somewhere. Hence the specific piece of string that codes for 
our universe will also be in there somewhere, and the anthropic principle explains that we will by 
logical necessity observe the specific universe in which we observers can live and not any of the 
specific universes in which we cannot live. 
One way of picturing what it means for a string of bits to code for concrete things like apples, laws of 
physics and ourselves, is via the analogy of the game known as Twenty Questions. In this game one 
person has to guess which word the other person has in mind through asking that person a series of 
questions with 'yes or no' answers. "[T]he game of Twenty Questions, if played cleverly, can deal with 
an enormous amount of information. The trick is to divide the possible answers into roughly equal 
batches, over and over again. As long as each question is designed to differentiate between more or 
less equally probable alternatives, each answer reveals one bit. In trying to guess the location of a 
[town in the] US, for example, ask ['Is it east of the Mississippi?', because that question] neatly 
divide[s] the country into two equal areas." (Baeyer 2004:29) If a description of each thing in the 
world can be fully specified in the form of a gradual series of binary possibilities (such as in this 
example happens through asking a series of 'yes or no' questions so as to systematically hone in on a 
specific word), then perhaps the world is a series of binary possibilities.  
The next Figure shows a string of 4 bits. This corresponds with 2^4=16 possibilities. Say possibility 
0110 describes our universe (only for the sake of argument, of course, since it would take a lot more 
bits to describe the actual complexity of the universe). The selection of this particular bit string from 
the 16 possibilities is here symbolized as a diagram of bifurcating paths or branches, in which the 
selected values of each bit are colored red. The black possibilities here represent alternative 
universes. The reason a selection occurs is the anthropic principle (viz. that only the universe 
represented by the red symbols contains us observers).      
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Figure 10: A four-bit string visualized as bifurcating paths. 
The next figure does the same, with bions instead of bits. (This requires no change to the basic 
structure of a string, since bions already have a structure similar to that of a bifurcating diagram).  
Figure 11: Visual representation of a finite piece of an infinite sequence of bions. The bions colored in 
red constitute the specific information describing (things in) our universe, the bions colored in black 
correspond with the information describing (things in) alternate universes.  
We can now return to the question which Section 3.3 ended with and formulate an answer: In the 
absence of space, how can units of information such as bits be arranged into some kind of order? The 
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answer I propose here is that the ultimate multiverse consists of information with bions instead of 
bits as its basic unit. A string of bions has an internal order, intrinsic to the nature of what bions are, 
instead of like bits only possessing an order relative to an external frame of reference such as space.  
That internal order is that bions are arranged into a juxtaposition in which each bion relates to each 
other bion in one of three objectively definable ways: Either the two are directly next to each other, 
or bion x contains bion y (or bion x contains yet another bion which in turn contains yet another bion 
which in turn contains bion y, and so on), or bion x is contained by (or in other words: nested into) 
bion y (or bion x is contained by yet another bion which in turn is contained by bion y). To contain 
and to be contained by are two concepts (more specifically: two relations) which are different from 
each other in an objective sense, unlike for instance the two concepts being the left thing and being 
the right thing, which only have meaning relative to where in space the person observing things 
happens to be standing.  
Figure 12: The three ways in which the position of a bion can be arranged relative to the position of 
another bion. 
In conclusion, a string of bions has the intrinsic property of being arranged into an order, and 
'reading' that order from one particular side to the other is objectively dissimilar to reading it into the 
other direction. Therefore, unlike in a multiverse made of bits, in a multiverse made of bions the 
anthropic principle can explain why we live in one particular universe instead of in another without 
running into the paradox of 'Bits derive their ability to describe complex things from the specific 
order of their arrangement in space, and space exists because there is a specific string of bits which 
by their specific order describe the existence of space'.         
3.8 In Figure 11 bions were represented as a string of binary possibilities, of which always one and 
only one obtains (i.e. actually exists, such as 'our universe or one of the things contained by - and 
composing - our universe', in contrast with things that only exists in alternate universes). This was 
how the world looks when we describe or define something in the game of Twenty Questions. I end 
this chapter by presenting a variant to 'this way of representing which possibilities in a series of bions 
obtain'.   
Again, imagine that every component of the world can be classified into a nested taxonomy in which 
each level constitutes two diametrically opposed things. For example the two categories 'southern 
hemisphere' and 'northern hemisphere', of which the latter in turn contains the two categories 
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'United States of America' and 'not the United States of America', of which the former in turn 
contains the two categories 'East of the Mississippi' and 'West of the Mississippi'. These categories 
are in principle mutually exclusive. It is however possible for something to be located in both 
categories simultaneously, such as a thing extending across the Mississippi river and thereby 
inhabiting both the Eastern and Western shore (e.g. a bridge).  
Another example of two things which are different - and opposite - in one respect only, are protons 
and their antiparticles; antiprotons. Both these particles have the exact same characteristics, except 
for their charge, in which they are opposite. Yet both exist. The same goes for electrons and their 
antiparticles; positrons.  
Conversely, there are many opposite things which don't exist. Far more than do exist, in fact. A 
proton has two thousand times as much mass as an electron, but presumably no particle exists with 
one thousand times the mass of an electron, or five hundred times, and so on. We can imagine what, 
if 'the particle with one thousand times the mass of an electron' did exist, its antiparticle (i.e. a thing 
identical to it in every respect except for having an opposite charge) would look like - yet neither of 
the two exists.  
If we order all these particles into a nested taxonomy, this yields a picture such as in Figure 13:  
Figure 13: Visual representation of a finite piece of an infinite sequence of bions. The bions colored in 
red constitute the specific information describing things which exist in our universe, the bions colored 
in black correspond with the information describing things which only exist in alternate universes. 
Compare Figure 11 with Figure 13. In the former figure each bion in a sequence always has one 
alternative which obtains and one which doesn't. In the latter figure some bions have alternatives 
both of which do obtain, some bions have only one alternative which obtains, and some bions have 
no alternatives which obtain but can nevertheless contain bions which in turn contain bions which do 
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have an alternative which obtains. Note that the simultaneous existence of, for instance, both 
electrons and their opposite, positrons, isn't a contradiction: Figure 13 refers to a situation where we 
describe which things exist, and two distinct things can exist as long as they don't occupy the same 
location in space at the same time. By contrast, Figure 11 refers to a situation where we define one 
specific thing by classifying it into mutually contradictory categories, such as 'East of the Mississippi' 
and 'West of the Mississippi', so here two adjacent red circles would be a contradiction (the game of 
Twenty Questions only allows for yes-or-no answers, even for things extending across the river, in 
which case the answer is still either yes or no, in this case chosen at random).  
These are the two ways in which the anthropic principle can visualize how 'in a series of bions some 
possibilities obtain and some possibilities don't'. In the next chapter I address the question 'Why are 
there bions rather than no bion at all?'.  
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4 Why are there bions rather than no bion at all? 
 
4.1 The previous chapter explained how the anthropic principle explains why instead of an infinite 
amount of bions we observe a finite, specific amount of contingent, concrete things (viz. apples, laws 
of nature, etc.). In other words, it explained why there is something rather than everything. This 
leaves the question of why there' initially' was everything rather than nothing. (Since a specific 
timeline is something which only exists inside - and as part of - a universe, the cause of - or reason for 
- the existence of the universe can't have the nature of an event happening at a moment in time. So 
the term 'initially' in the above sentence doesn't refer to an event preceding another event in time, 
but rather as something preceding the existence of the universe only in the sense of 'being a cause or 
reason underlying - and thereby explaining - its existence'). So 'before' the anthropic selection of the 
universe from the ultimate multiverse of bions took place, why was there an infinite series of bions 
rather than no bions; no thing of any kind at all? 
The infinite series of bions is an unbounded, unlimited collection of meaningless information. This 
information exists as a multiverse of actual, concrete but random things when viewed from the 
perspective of those randomly selected things themselves. This means the bion multiverse qualifies 
as chaos. At the same time, from the perspective of highly specific and complex things such as us 
observers, a corner of that multiverse appears that is highly structured (i.e. our universe). This 
universe came into being in a comprehensible way. And as such Anaxiamander, mentioned above, 
might consider 'postulating bions as the metaphysical chaos underlying and causing our universe' the 
ultimate answer as to why the world exists. After all, the boundless arguably requires no origin, since 
that would impose a limit onto it and thereby contradict its nature of being unlimited (see Section 
2.1).   
Deutsch, in an interview with Holt about the question of why there is something rather than nothing, 
remarks: "I don't think that an ultimate explanation of reality is possible [...] That doesn't mean I 
think there's a limit to what we can explain. We'll never run into a brick wall which says, 'NO 
EXPLANATION BEYOND THIS POINT.' On the other hand, I don't think we'll find a brick wall that says, 
'THIS IS THE ULTIMATE EXPLANATION FOR EVERYTHING.' In fact, those two brick walls would be 
almost the same. If, qua impossibile, you were to have an ultimate explanation, it would mean the 
philosophical problem of why that was the true explanation - why reality was this way and not 
another - would be forever insoluble. [cfr. Nozick in Section 3.4] The real question you want to 
answer is not what came before, but why something is the way it is. [...] You can't give a once-and-
for-all definition of what an explanation is [...] In fact, important explanatory advances often change 
the meaning of explanation. [...] Anything pretending to be an 'ultimate' explanation would be a bad 
explanation, because there would be nothing left over to explain why it was the right one - to explain 
why reality was that way and not another way. [...] And the question Why is there something rather 
than nothing? is a layered one, I expect. Even if you succeeded in answering it at some level, you'd 
still have the next level to worry about." (Holt 2012:125-9) 
Postulating an ultimate multiverse of bions, then, in its similarity to the Boundless, is one 
interpretation of what an ultimate answer may look like. We can search for another explanatory 
level, one which - according to the criteria of another interpretation of what an ultimate answer is - 
amounts to a deeper layer of explanation, which in this case would be 'explaining why bions exist'. 
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My approach to formulate an answer to the question of why bions exist starts with a concept known 
as the principle of non-contradiction.  
4.2 Aristotle considered the principle of non-contradiction to be the most fundamental law that all 
existing things adhere to, as well as the most elementary logical principle underlying rational 
thinking. This principle states that two opposing possibilities or assertions can't be true at the same 
place at the same time. And that likewise no existing thing can ever have all the exact same 
properties that another existing thing has (otherwise there by definition would be only one thing, not 
two). This principle "[...] has no specific subject matter, but applies to everything that is." (Gottlieb 
2015) The idea that we must avoid making self-contradictory statements is so basic to rational 
discourse that it, even though understood and obeyed, is rarely mentioned explicitly. When 
something is logically necessary, it is because its alternative would constitute a logical contradiction.  
Would the nonexistence of a bion constitute a logical contradiction? As we saw in Section 2.1, Hume 
and Kant thought it to be the case that the nonexistence of an entity or being could never qualify as a 
logical contradiction. But bions, with their peculiar nature, I think are an exception in that regard. To 
see why, consider the following - this time brief - thought experiment.  
Imagine the state of affairs that nothing exists, except for a bion. Now remove the bion from the 
picture. The way we picture the second state of affairs is by negating the first, i.e. we derive a mental 
representation of 'no bion' from imagining a bion and then postulating its exact opposite. What is the 
relation between a bion and no bion? That they are distinct. Therefore, I argue, a bion and its 
opposite, along with the relation between them which expresses that they are opposite, together 
form a representation of another bion. Hence we didn't actually succeed in imagining no bion. (Why 
not start off imagining nothing, including no bion? Because according to a relationist worldview, you 
would still be placing that nothing in an existing framework relative to which it exists, e.g. the 
framework of your own existence since you need to exist to picture it. In this section I argue that the 
impossibility to move from a picture of 'nothing except a bion' to a picture of 'not even a bion' 
through merely negating the former, explains why the world is relationist).       
By contrast, we can picture the opposite of there being an apple. This is because we automatically 
place an apple in a contextual framework in which space, color, size, and us observers, exist, all of 
which remain in existence after the apple is removed. A single relation, such as the relation between 
the concepts 'an apple' and 'no apple', is far less complex than the nature of an apple itself. But due 
to a bion's extreme lack of complexity, the relation between 'a bion' and 'no bion' has the same 
complexity as a bion. As well as having the same nature of referring to two opposite states of affairs. 
Picturing the opposite of a bion merely constitutes imagining a string of bions and moving your focus 
from one bion in that string to the next bion in it. That indicates that -and possibly explains why - 
reality is such that there can be one specific something rather than another specific something, but 
not no thing whatsoever. 
Is this indeed a conclusive solution to the problem of why there is something rather than nothing, or 
is this rather a case of the so called philosopher's phallacy, i.e. "mistaking a failure of imagination for 
an insight into reality." (Holt 2012:266)? Does the apparent impossibility to imagine a situation 
where no bion exists, amount to an explanation of why bions do exist? And by which criteria of what 
comprises an explanation, would - or wouldn't - this be the case? In order to place this matter into 
context, I will now move on to yet another layer of explanation. 
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4.3 In philosophy, a distinction is commonly made between on the one hand the ontological; the field 
of what exists, and on the other hand the epistemic; the field of how we can know what exists. In a 
world composed of information the boundary between these two categories can become blurred, 
since there not only our knowledge (in the form of specific neural firing patterns in the brain 
corresponding with specific ideas about the outside world) consists of information, but also the 
elementary 'particles' of which the physical realm itself is built. Some philosophers, usually referred 
to as idealists, go as far as to reject the existence of 'a world existing independent of thoughts', cfr. 
relativism in Section 3.6. Realists, on the other hand, believe there to be an outside world which 
would still exist in the absence of anyone that can observe its existence.  
The view I propose in this paper is that the anthropic principle explains why it's not a coincidence 
that relative to us our particular universe exists, yet that 'our' universe and every other possible 
universe would still exist without us. And that both thoughts on the one hand', as well as the most 
elementary 'particles' composing physical reality on the other hand, are both information. But that 
there nevertheless is something of a difference between the kind of information of thoughts and the 
kind of information of particles, namely that the former is the special case of a piece of physical 
material being set up by likewise physical processes to systematically generate a copy of relevant 
aspects of the again physical environment. Due to practical constraints, this copy can never have the 
full algorithmic complexity of the environment it attempts to render (i.e. attempts to copy, attempts 
to encode). Therefore, although both thoughts and particles are ultimately and exclusively composed 
of bions, the specific way these bions manifest themselves in the concrete setting of what specifically 
goes on in our universe here and now, means there is a significant and qualitative difference 
between them that makes me classify myself as a realist and not as an idealist.     
Despite the distinction which thus emerges between the ontological realm and the epistemic realm 
once the level of concrete things such as rocks or brains is reached, that distinction doesn't 
unambiguously apply to bions in their 'initial' state. (By their initial state I mean the string of bions in 
which no specific alternatives within that string have been selected, as is the case in Figure 5, and in 
contrast to the situation represented in Figure 11). Bions clearly overlap with the ontological, since 
they are the building blocks of physical things such as matter, space and the laws governing the 
interaction between - for instance - matter and space. That they also overlap with the epistemic, 
however, can be seen when more closely examining the nature of the principle of non-contradiction: 
The principle of non-contradiction, in stating that opposite things can't simultaneously be true, 
establishes the nature of what it means for things to be distinct from each other. As mentioned 
above, this principle applies to all things; it is context independent. From the fact that this principle is 
able to serve as a universal guideline to how to accurately describe reality, it follows that reality has 
the nature of not being self-contradictory. Reality, in other words, may ultimately consist of the 
principle of non-contradiction, i.e. of the basic 'unit' of logic. (Provided, that is, that the simplicity of 
such an abstract structure somehow contains within itself the ability for 'the complex and specific 
world we see around us' to automatically emerge from it. But as argued in the previous chapter, the 
anthropic principle, when operating in an ultimate multiverse of information, has that ability). 
In a relationist view of the world (see Section 3.6), reality at its most fundamental level consists of 
relations. A relation always exists between - and thereby distinguishes between - two or more things. 
A relation thus conforms to the principle of non-contradiction. The simplest relation is between two 
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things. The simplest state of affairs is a relation between two things which themselves have the 
minimal possible complexity. Arguably, in a relational world things which possess the minimal 
possible complexity are those things which themselves exist only in relation to the next two things, 
and so on, in a nested structure, viz. bions. Rather than only conforming to the principle of non-
contradiction, this and the previous paragraph thus suggest that this simplest possible relation 
actually is the principle of non-contradiction.  
And hence that the conventional distinction between the ontological and the epistemic breaks down 
at their level of abstractness; that bions and basic logic, i.e. bions and the principle of non-
contradiction, are one and the same thing. (Consider, as an analogy, the question What was first, the 
chicken or the egg? The answer is that chickens, and of course also their eggs, ultimately evolved 
from a single cell organism. Because that single cell ancestor reproduced through cell division, parent 
and offspring were identical. Likewise, the entities which gave rise to what in the current context of a 
complex universe are now two distinct concepts of epistemic and ontological, were identical to each 
other in the minimally complex state of affairs from which they originate. That original state of affairs 
is a string of bions not being looked at from the perspective of only a select part of that string, i.e. a 
string of bions that hasn't undergone antropic selection). 
This gives the following interpretation of what occurs in the thought experiment presented in the 
previous section: When we try to switch from picturing a bion to a situation devoid of any bions, we 
try to imagine a world no longer composed of logic, and therefore no longer describable by logic. Just 
like it makes no sense to ask what happened the minute before the big bang, because time only 
exists within - and as part of - the universe, no logical reason can be required for the existence of 
logic itself. 
This explains why of the nine levels of nothing presented in Section 2.2, arguing that levels eight and 
nine are possibilities on a par with the other seven levels is problematic; in level 8 logic doesn't exist, 
and therefore any description of it by definition constitutes a nonsensical state of affairs. It's not just 
that of all the possible places, we happen to live in a place that logic does apply to, but rather the 
following: We can't infer from anything we know, nor from anything we've ever encountered in 
reality, that there can exist some alternative to a world where logic does apply, since inferring, 
reasoning, arguments, rational thoughts, are based on logic, so that outside reality there is nothing to 
do the inferring with. Conversely, neither does that prove there can't be anything outside of the 
logic-governed world, merely that we lack any appropriate framework to make any rational 
statements about that subject.  
In conclusion, the boundaries of the ontological and the epistemic (i.e. what there is and what can be 
known about it) merge in a world made of bions, thereby each explaining why the other one reaches 
its limit at that point: In a world composed of bions, understanding what the world is yields the 
answer that 'There is something rather than nothing because the existence of nothing would be a 
logical contradiction.' This is the option listed at the end of Aristotles' and Rescher's overviews of 
possible answers presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.     
4.4 Kuhn, in the introduction to his twenty-seven category classification of responses to the question 
of why there is something rather than nothing, remarks that those responses "[...] can be combined 
in any number of ways - in series, in parallel, and/or nested." (Leslie & Kuhn 2013:249). In the current 
section I examine the five categories of Kuhn's classification which the bion-based answer fits into, in 
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chronological order, and briefly analyze in what way each does so. (Due to constraints on space, I 
won't address the 22 categories which the answer provided by bion theory doesn't correspond with).    
Kuhn's first category is titled "Meaningless question." In this response, the words comprising the 
question are deemed meaningless to begin with, as those words "[...] transcend boundaries of 
ordinary usage so as to lose their grounding." Demanding a logical reason for why there is logic in the 
first place arguably qualifies as an example of this, hence conducting the bion thought experiment 
retrospectively shows the question to be meaningless in at least some of its aspects. 
Kuhn's second response relevant to the answer proposed in this paper, is "Multiverse by 
Mathematics. Generated by Max Tegmark's hypothesis that every conceivable consistent 
mathematical form or structure corresponds to a physical parallel universe which actually exists." As 
stated in Section 3.6, the web of bions constitutes a fractal, which is one of the mathematical forms 
which Tegmark explicitly designates to be one of the candidates for the structure of the Level IV 
multiverse. However, bions are a too homogenous fractal to specify, by their structure, the particular 
characteristics of the universe, contrary to what Tegmark has in mind. (Instead of having an 
intrinsically complex structure, bions constitute the potential for specific information to be selected, 
like a blank memory card in a computer). 
An option of Kuhn's list, which does fully apply to the bion-based worldview and therefore requires 
no additional comment, is the "Multiverse by All Possibilities. Generated by the hypothesis that 
each and every logically possible mode of existence is a real thing and really exists, that possible 
worlds are as real as the world we inhabit, since the things that we call merely possible (from our 
perspective) are all of them existing somewhere else[.]"   
Another highly relevant category is called "Abstract Objects/Platonic forms as Cause. Although 
philosophers deny that abstract objects can have causal effects on concrete objects (abstract objects 
are often defined as causally inert), their potential, say as a collective, to be an explanatory source of 
ultimate reality cannot be logically excluded. (This assumes that abstract objects - such as numbers, 
logic, universals, propositions - manifest real existence on some plane of existence not in 
spacetime.)" Bions are abstract objects, overlapping with the concept of logic and existing outside of 
spacetime. They constitute the potential for concrete objects to arise via the anthropic principle, 
although this is more of a selection process (analogous to biological evolution) than straightforward 
causation (e.g. laws of physics). 
The fifth and last relevant category is "Beyond Concepts and Categories. Approaching ultimate 
reality is impossible for human thought, [...] because whatever fundamental existence may be, it 
must escape all our concepts and categories. This is not a matter of limited knowledge, but rather of 
absolute unknowability, a boundary that is in principle impenetrable." (Leslie & Kuhn 2013:250-6) 
This does not apply to bions, but to whatever next layer or more fundamental reality someone might, 
justifiably or unjustifiably (and in line with the view of Deutsch an Nozick that each level of 
explanation requires yet another level of explanation) wish to postulate as underlying bions, or as 
explaining logic itself. (See previous Section).  
On the basis of Kuhn's categories, we can for example summarize the type of answer which this 
paper gives to the question of 'why there is something rather than nothing' as follows: A logically 
non-contingent and scale-invariant abstract object, itself existing outside of spacetime and the 
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nonexistence of which would be a state of affairs beyond what can be conceptualized, exposes some 
inconsistencies in the question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' and answers what 
remains of that question. 
Or for a more schematic example of how the bion theory would fit into Kuhn's categorization, see 
Figure 14 below. The box on the upper left represents Kuhn's Beyond Concepts and Categories. Two 
arrows depart from it. The one pointing to the right symbolizes that the idea that a situation without 
logic would be beyond any concept or category we can fathom, which renders the question of why 
there is something rather than nothing to some degree meaningless. The downward arrow indicates 
that Abstract Objects/Platonic forms exist because the alternative would be the kind of self-
contradiction belonging to the realm of Beyond Concepts and Categories. Parallel to this downward 
arrow is another arrow, pointing downward from the Meaningless question box, which symbolizes 
that the existence of Abstract Objects can likewise be thought of as self-evident due to the reason 
that the notion of their nonexistence would be meaningless. The box below embodies the Abstract 
Object or Platonic form  of a bion, or synonymously of the basic logical principle of non-contradiction. 
Because if there is one bion, there automatically is an infinite amount of bions, a downward arrow 
departs here as well. This arrow, in series with the two parallel previous ones, points towards the box 
characterized as Multiverse by All Possibilities, or in other words, the infinite string of bions, which 
can be said to be caused by the existence of the abstract object of the single bion in the box above it. 
The last box is the Multiverse by Mathematics, or in other words a vast amount of abstract yet 
specific mathematical configurations which govern and constitute the physical laws and constants 
that make up our specific universe. These specific mathematical entities are manifestations of 
selection taking place in the initially undifferentiated string of bions, e.g. via the anthropic principle, 
and are therefore a constituent of the Multiverse of All Possibilities, i.e. their category is nested into 
the latter. To sum up, the answer bions provide to why there is something rather than nothing, is a 
combination of five of Kuhn's twenty seven categories, interrelating in series and in parallel as well as 
in a nested structure.   
 
Figure 14: Kuhn's five categories which make up the answer provided by bions as to why there is 
something rather than nothing. Parallel, serial and nested structures are here symbolized to describe 
how these categories interrelate.      
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5 Bions as Popperian metaphysics  
 
5.1 The nature of bions has now been outlined, and was subsequently fitted into the framework of 
some existing systematical taxonomies of answers to why there is something rather than nothing. In 
the current chapter, we'll zoom out further, by addressing the practical implications (or lack thereof) 
of a world composed of bions. How does a universe yielded by a multiverse of bions differ from a 
universe not ultimately derived from bions? In other words, what predictions does the theory 
presented in this paper make, and how can its predictions be used to prove or disprove this theory? 
On these points, my answer is brief: I think the idea that the world is ultimately composed of bions 
makes no empirically testable predictions.  
Rather, 'no scientific theory about the origin of the universe which  I can currently think of' would 
definitively preclude the possibility that on some sort of deeper level (i.e. deeper according to some 
philosophical, speculative, subjective criteria) the world consists of bions after all. I don't consider 
this principal lack of falsifiability a merit, neither in general nor in the specific case of the theory 
presented in this paper. But I think the bion theory does elucidate the inherent unfalsifiability - and 
thus the inherently unscientific nature - of the question of why there is something rather than 
nothing. In other words, that the nature of my answer to the question 'Why is there something 
rather than nothing?' reflects the nature of that question, and that the bion theory's most significant 
merit thus lies in its role of clarifying that this question is inherently unscientific (cfr. the category 
Meaningless question in the previous section).       
Since explaining the origin of the world via 'the bion theory' therefore can't be considered science, 
how can bion theory be classified instead? My choice for a candidate is metaphysics, specifically 
Popper's interpretation of that field. We've already encountered the line of thinking of this twentieth 
century philosopher in Deutsch's interpretation of what explanation means (See Section 4.1). The 
next section starts discussing the Popperian notion of metaphysical explanation with three 
paragraphs of some of Deutsch's words on the subject.   
5.2 Deutsch considers explanation to be more than just prediction. He thereby rejects a purely 
reductionist interpretation of what science is about. In a reductive form of scientific explanation, 
things are analyzed into components. "For example, the resistance of a wall to being penetrated or 
knocked down is explained by regarding the wall as a vast aggregation of interacting molecules. The 
properties of those molecules are themselves explained in terms of their constituent atoms, and the 
interaction of those atoms with one another, and so on down to the smallest particles and most basic 
forces. Reductionists think that all scientific explanations, and perhaps all sufficiently deep 
explanations of any kind, take that form. The reductionist conception leads naturally to a 
classification of [...] theories in a hierarchy, according to how close they are to the 'lowest-level' 
predictive theories that are known. I this hierarchy, logic and mathematics form the immovable 
bedrock on which the edifice of science is built. [...] Much of basic chemistry has been reduced to 
physics in this way. But for higher-level sciences the reductionist program is a matter of principle 
only. No one expects actually to deduce many principles of biology, psychology or politics from those 
of physics. The reason why higher-level subjects can be studied at all is that under special 
circumstances the stupendously complex behaviour of vast numbers of particles resolves itself into a 
measure of simplicity and comprehensibility. This is called emergence: high-level simplicity 'emerges' 
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from low level complexity." This doesn't mean, however, that Deutsch advocates the other extreme: 
"By the way, the opposite of reductionism, holism - the idea that the only legitimate explanations are 
in terms of higher-level systems - is an even greater error than reductionism." To a reductionist, 
physics supplies the deepest possible form of explanation. "But to everyone else scientific knowledge 
consists of explanations, and the structure of scientific explanation does not reflect the reductionist 
hierarchy. There are explanations at every level of the hierarchy." (Deutsch 1998:19-21) For bions 
this means that, although I've argued above that bions are 'the most fundamental constituents of 
reality that are logically possible', they nevertheless aren't necessarily a more important kind of 
explanation than higher-level subjects.  
Along with induction-based ways of explaining and proving things, such reductionism "[...] and all 
other prediction-centred theories of knowledge are based on a misconception. What we need is an 
explanation-centred theory of knowledge: a theory of how explanations come into being and how 
they are justified; a theory of how, why and when we should allow our perceptions to change our 
world-view. [T]he prevailing theory of scientific knowledge, which in its modern form is due largely to 
the philosopher Karl Popper [...] can indeed be regarded as a theory of explanations in this sense. It 
regards science as a problem-solving process." When existing scientific theories seem inadequate in 
any way, possibly but not necessarily due to being incompatible with new observations, "[...] that is 
what constitutes a problem." For example, an existing theory may be too superficial. Or it may be 
found to violate Occam's razor (See Section 2.4) when compared to an otherwise equal yet less 
complex explanation for the same phenomenon. Or two theories, despite both appearing compatible 
with current empirical evidence, may logically contradict each other. (idem: 61-2) The question of 
Why is there something rather than nothing? constitutes a problem. Bion theory, despite lacking 
concrete empirical underpinnings, can in this view be considered a solution to this problem, and the 
quality of this particular solution can be compared with that of other conjectured solutions on the 
basis of criteria such as its depth, universality, simplicity or 'possession or lack of internal logical 
contradictions'. Its inability to be disconfirmed by empirical evidence does however still place it 
outside of the realm of scientific discourse.     
Related to the reductionist idea that a hierarchy exists within the scientific disciplines, is the 
assumption "[...] that theories can be classified in a hierarchy [...] of decreasing intrinsic reliability[,]" 
in which the first category consists of things that are entirely mathematical, followed by the category 
of what can be scientifically proven, and ending with whatever can 'merely' be philosophically 
researched. "Many people take the existence of this hierarchy for granted, despite the fact that these 
judgements of comparative reliability depend entirely on philosophical arguments, arguments that 
classify themselves as quite unreliable! [...] The same assumption occurs in inductivism, which 
supposes that we can be absolutely certain of the conclusions of mathematical arguments because 
they are deductive, reasonably sure of scientific arguments because they are 'inductive', and forever 
undecided about philosophical arguments, which it sees as little more than matters of taste. But 
none of that is true. Explanations are not justified by the means by which they were derived; they are 
justified by their superior ability, relative to rival explanations, to solve the problems they address." 
(idem: 84) The notion of bions constitutes a philosophical theory.  
5.3 Regarding what kind of problems it is that philosophy and science address, Popper remarks that 
"A scientist engaged in a piece of research, say in physics, can attack his problem straight away. He 
can go at once to the heart of the matter: to the heart, that is, of an organized structure. For a 
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structure of scientific doctrines is already in existence; and with it, a generally accepted problem-
situation. This is why he may leave it to others to fit his contribution into the framework of scientific 
knowledge. The philosopher finds himself in a different position. He does not face an organized 
structure, but rather something resembling a heap of ruins (though perhaps with treasure buried 
underneath). He cannot appeal to the fact that there is a generally accepted problem-situation; for 
that there is no such thing is perhaps the one fact which is generally accepted." (Popper 2002:XV-XVI, 
see Chapter 1) "Popper further argues that a philosopher must before all else tackle philosophical 
problems, as well as speaking of philosophy, for ‘genuine philosophical problems are always rooted 
in urgent problems outside philosophy, and they die if these roots decay’[.] Any means to this end 
are valid: it is anyway sterile to try to define the correct method, because philosophy would then 
become application or technique rather than research." (Corvi 1997:144-5). 
Rather than rigidly focusing on a particular method of acquiring knowledge, or on a problem-
situation formulated necessarily through institutionalized research, Popper advocates a more 
pragmatic and down-to-earth approach: According to him, in order to get our priorities straight, we 
should take a step back to the here and now. "[A]ll problems— including the most complex 
theoretical ones—ultimately rest upon the practical problem of adaptation to the material 
environment, often by improving it, or upon the existential problem of the [...] moral conditions of 
life. The problem-situation is so deeply rooted in life that any solution, however felicitous, ‘opens up 
in its turn a whole new world of open problems’[,] which cannot be solved, at least not immediately, 
because knowledge cannot predict its own future conquests [...]" Ultimately, there is no rational 
reason for us to try to be rational, no matter how much we ponder deep and abstract questions 
about the nature of knowledge or the world. Instead, if we do engage in rational reasoning, then this 
is because we made the essentially irrational and highly subjective choice to do so, a choice we make 
because we have noticed that consistently doing so generally improves the concrete circumstances 
of ourselves and others. (idem:141-2)  
In discussing how the previous paragraph relates to bions, I'll start with Popper's definition of 
realism. "[T]o be a realist is simply to hold that the world exists and develops independently of 
human beings [...]" (Corvi 1997:79). There thus exists a reality outside of our model of it. But that 
reality and that model can easily be confused. Our model of the world arguably develops through 
psychological processes, unconsciously influenced by the ultimate factor of the interrelation between 
our genes and the whole of our environment, and the more proximate factor of our emotions or 
cognitive biases and the immediate problems presented by our environment. We can nevertheless 
attempt to base our decisions completely on rational reasoning, as if the brain were a blank slate, 
and as if the whole of our thought processes at any given moment could be fully conscious (and due 
to some persistent illusions, we are indeed prone to think our decisions are conscious and the 
product of free will). In that case we would be searching for an ultimate and rational reason to think 
rationally. Perhaps searching for an answer to 'why there is something rather than nothing' is 
sometimes an attempt to find an ultimate, rationally comprehensible foundation of reality, and 
hereby making the mistake of confusing that with an ultimate, rational foundation for the thoughts 
that compose our model of reality (i.e. confusing reality and the model of reality). By acknowledging 
that our rational reasoning about even the most abstract subjects ultimately starts as a largely 
unconscious adaptation to our material environment, I think Popper avoids making that mistake. 
Conversely, to someone who does seek an ultimately rational reason to be rational, and who does 
make that mistake (i.e. confuses 'the reason why he or she thinks a certain way about something' 
 
 
32 
 
with 'the reason why that something exists' ), it may appear that there must be a logical reason even 
for the existence of logic. And as argued in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, the impossibility to imagine 'a 
situation in which not even a bion exists' explains 'why there is something rather than nothing' 
because there can't be a logical reason for 'the existence of logic itself.  
To sum up the point made thus far in this chapter: I argue that bion theory solves the problem of 
'why there is something rather than nothing' according to specifically Popper's interpretation of what 
problem-solving entails. In the next section I continue elucidating Popper's distinction between the 
metaphysical element of problem-solving on the one hand, and elements of problem-solving based 
on falsifiability on the other hand.  
5.4 "What procedure distinguishes natural science from metaphysics?" Popper argues against the 
notion that science is entirely about induction, i.e. that taking a series of empirical observations and 
assuming that whatever is constant throughout them thus far, will remain immutable forever and 
therefore constitutes a law of nature. Since the decision to think rationally cannot itself be made 
rationally, "[...] scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of a purely 
speculative kind, and sometimes even quite hazy; a faith which is completely unwarranted from the 
point of view of science, and which, to that extent, is ‘metaphysical’." According to Corvi, this view by 
Popper "[...] does not involve a methodological abandonment of experience; the theory of 
knowledge is understood precisely as a ‘theory of empirical method’ [...]—but it is a theory which, in 
accounting for real scientific procedures and results, goes beyond the mere accumulation of 
experiential data. In sum, Popper’s problem is to find a distinction between science and pseudo-
science that does not dismiss the latter as mere nonsense. Often theories start out as metaphysical 
or mythical and only subsequently acquire a scientific dimension; it hardly seems consistent to 
describe as simply unintelligible or meaningless, discourses which at a certain point show themselves 
to be endowed with meaning. Right from his early reflections, Popper was convinced that 
metaphysics is not nonsense and that it is impossible to rid science of every metaphysical element— 
although, of course, he thought it desirable to remove the metaphysical elements whenever that was 
possible[.]" (Corvi 1997:23-5) 
"[A]ny doctrine, whether ontological or not, is defined by Popper as ‘metaphysical’ if it cannot in 
principle be falsified or refuted." (Corvi 1997:78). But although a metaphysical theory can't be 
falsified directly through observation, it can be refuted by finding logical contradiction within it. 
"What is true of science in general thus also applies to Popper’s epistemology: its falsity can be 
demonstrated but not its truth, and so it is necessary to be content with what proves free of 
contradiction, both internally and in relation to external reality." (idem:45). Popper considers the 
principle of non-contradiction the metaphysical equivalent what falsification is to science. "It is 
obvious that contradiction is a sign of falsity and that a self-contradictory system must be rejected 
because it is false, and falsifiability has the same function on an empirical rather than logical level." 
(idem:27). The way of thinking which Popper proposes, Albert agrees, is "[...] nothing less than the 
methodological equivalent of the principle of non-contradiction." (idem:163).  
In general, metaphysics establishes a picture of the structure that encompassing the whole of 
scientific theories and the relations between them. (Corvi 1997:129). Popper argues for "[...] the 
existence of different levels of understanding, [and] he shows how important it is for us to analyse 
the problem-situation, not only to devise a solution but even to understand the solution itself, by 
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reconstructing the historical stages through which it was elaborated, criticized, modified and finally 
accepted[.]" (idem:141). Nevertheless, although Popper is convinced of the existence of an external, 
objective reality of which our knowledge - through rational thinking - can always become an 
increasingly accurate approximation, he does not believe in certainty. (idem:130).   
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6 Recapitulation and conclusion 
 
6.1 In Chapter 3 I introduced bions via a thought experiment of directly picturing what a bion is. In 
the subsequent chapters I've established a framework of how that abstract notion of bions can be 
fitted into existing conceptions of how the world is, and thereby discussed which answers bion 
theory implies for the question of why there is something rather than nothing. Another approach 
would be to work in the opposite direction; to begin by advocating a general philosophical position, 
describe how it relates to that question, and then specifying my individual version of that position 
step by step until a metaphorical picture of bions emerges from this presented context. In the 
current chapter I will recapitulate bion theory in the latter direction: 
Why is there something rather than nothing? In a Popperian worldview, explanation tends to come in 
layers, yet the position of one layer vis-à-vis another layer doesn't necessarily correspond with one 
explanation being superior to another. Therefore, the reason why there is something rather than 
nothing neither has to be the same kind of explanation as the reason why there is one particular 
thing rather than another particular thing, nor does it have to be deeper or more fundamental than 
the latter. Instead, the reason why there is something rather than nothing may not constitute a 
cause, i.e. an in principle falsifiable and therefore scientific notion. Nor does the relation between the 
two states of affairs of the existence of something on the one hand and the existence of nothing on 
the other hand, even necessarily constitute a logical relation. Hence the question may be to some 
extent meaningless.  
I suggest logic is something, and that asking Why isn't there nothing at all? is therefore tantamount 
to asking What factor external to logic explains why there is logic? And that question of course 
involves a logical contradiction, similar to asking What happened the minute before time existed? All 
this amounts to a logical explanation for why Nothing 8 from Section 2.2 doesn't exist - and never 
has. But according to which criteria is logic something? Logic, after all, is epistemic; it's an abstract 
method of ascertaining which things concretely exist. Epistemic as opposed to being ontological. The 
ontological, by contrast, refers to 'the things which concretely exist' themselves. 
 I also suggest, however, that complex logic on the one hand, and concrete things, such as matter, on 
the other hand, both originate from the same ancestral entity. I further argue that logic is the basic 
unit of the epistemic, and that the principle of non-contradiction is in turn the basic unit of logic. And 
that information is what matter (as well as the ontological in general) consists of, with binary digits 
being the basic unit of information. And finally, that the binary digit in its most abstract form, is 
identical to the principle of non-contradiction. In this view, 'logic is something' because on a 
fundamental level there no longer exists any distinction between the epistemic and the ontological.   
However, to get to a truly abstract form of the binary digit, we must first divorce it from the concrete 
context to which we are accustomed, viz. our specific universe with its particular spatial dimensions 
and timeline. And in doing so, we stumble upon the problem that information can only derive 'its 
ability to encode complex things' from multiple bits being arranged in a particular sequence within 
time and space. (If our universe is a simulation running on a computer, where is that computer itself 
located?)  
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We circumvent that problem by replacing bits with a unit of information of which the internal 
structure allows for multiple bit-like entities to be arranged in an order independent of any 
spatiotemporal context. Namely the binary distinction, with its infinite branching off into additional 
bions in a nested, self-defined and thereby self-contained structure. Postulating the existence of 
bions corresponds with the conjecture that our universe is part of an infinite string of bits in which no 
particular values (1 versus 0) have been specified. In other words; an infinitely large multiverse of 
random information, or in different terms still; the existence of everything instead of nothing. That in 
turn leaves the following question: Why are there, apparently and at least relative to us, only some 
specific things rather than the existence of everything?  
The answer to this is the anthropic principle. This principle states that observers are components of a 
whole which they can't integrally observe because observers themselves constitute only a specific  
set of information within that whole. They can only observe the specific circumstances compatible 
with - and composing - their own existence, since the alternative of course would be a logical 
contradiction. Thus the anthropic principle explains why at our position in the field of possibilities 
there only exist some things rather than everything.  
6.2 In conclusion: The question Why is there something rather than nothing? is open to many 
interpretations. In philosophy - Popper's view of philosophy in particular - proposed solutions 
retroactively shape our understanding of the nature of the problem or question which they have 
responded to. Through the bion thought experiment, I have arrived at an interpretation of this 
question along the following lines: When it comes to the origin of the world, what is the nature of the 
ultimate conceivable boundary to this process? 
Its answer, as suggested by the theory presented in this paper, depends on the degree to which 
someone considers explanation to be hierarchical. For the sake of clarity, I will elaborate on this 
point by presenting the two extremes of this continuum. For the sake of succinctness, I will discuss 
only one intermediate viewpoint, although there's a host of other viewpoints in between those two 
extremes .  
On one end is the philosophical position that methods of knowledge-gathering interrelate in a strictly 
hierarchical way. Whatever way of thinking applies to the base of this hierarchical pyramid (and in 
this case that base consists of the relation between the existence of something on the one hand, and 
whatever is to be understood as the alternative state of affairs on the other hand, while layers closer 
to the top of the pyramid include subjects like the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology and 
sociology, respectively), is elevated to 'the status of being superior to all other forms of thinking' just 
because it has that position in the pyramid. In bion theory, the foundation of that hierarchy consists 
of bions. And the way of thinking that applies to the relation between the existence of something 
(i.e. bions) and nothing (i.e. the existence of no bions) is logic. Logic in its arguably most basic form, 
namely the principle of non-contradiction. Because the relation between 'a bion' and 'no bion' is 
itself a bion, the 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' question is tantamount to requesting 
'a reason external to logic' for the existence of logic itself (which in retrospect makes it largely a 
meaningless question). Therefore the ultimate reason something exists is that 'the existence of 
nothing' would be a logical contradiction. (Like any rational idea, this answer can of course be 
refuted by finding a logical contradiction within bion theory).  
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But at the same time, bion theory turns out not to tell us anything concrete about 'the world here 
and now'. For example, it doesn't specify the value of constants in physics, such as the speed of light. 
Although instead, bion theory does explain where the potential comes from for these constants to be 
selected via the anthropic principle: Namely why an infinite string of initially unspecified information 
exists - and the anthropic principle itself is also just the application of the principle of non-
contradiction. Bion theory thus explains why the higher level, emergent laws of nature such as the 
speed of light exist, but not what value they have in our specific universe. Therefore, the way of 
thinking that applies to 'the relation between something and nothing' is not a form of knowledge 
that's superior to science. This argues against the existence of a strict hierarchy in how fields of 
knowledge interrelate.            
On the other extreme is the idea that there's no hierarchy whatsoever, cfr. relativism. The question 
of Why is there something rather than nothing? here doesn't a priori get assigned a higher status 
than any other question. Nor does its answer necessarily have any implications for the nature of 
knowledge itself. In this view, bion theory is merely a series of tautological statements: The bion 
thought experiment is a line of reasoning, which sets out with the intent 'to be logically coherent 
throughout' (like all rational thinking), and I ended this line of reasoning at the moment that I 
stumbled upon an idea that would entail a contradiction (namely 'the existence of no bion). In other 
words, I didn't go any further because I had decided not to beforehand; my ending at that point just 
communicated a repetition of what I already (implicitly) communicated by commencing a line of 
logical reasoning in the first place.  
Conversely, the significance of bion theory resides in the assumption that my small line of reasoning 
is a continuation of a vast historical line of reasoning about the origin of the world, all the way 
through the sequence of causes and effects of the physics of the big bang and the chemical synthesis 
of DNA to the universe with life and observers existing in the here and now: It is only in that context, 
that 'the fact that the line of reasoning I present contains a point where, contrary to every step 
before it, it suddenly turns out we can no longer go any further' teaches us something about the 
world at large. And in the absence of any degree of hierarchy between our pieces of knowledge from 
different fields, any line drawn to link them is a random and meaningless exercise. To sum up, 
without a hierarchy bion theory doesn't imply anything.     
Hence, both extremes have a problem which bion theory doesn't integrally solve. Popper's worldview 
lies somewhere in between those extremes, and seems to be more compatible with bion theory. In 
his view, forms of knowledge, such as metaphysics and empirical science, or physics and chemistry 
within science, are linked. But not in a hierarchy in which one form of knowledge is necessarily 
superior to another. Their usefulness depends on their ability to answer problems, and which theory 
best describes 'the relation between fields of knowledge' can likewise be inferred from the problem-
solving  capacity of one such theory versus another. And finally, Popper advocates the superiority of 
rationality over irrationality, both as a principle underlying this methodology and as a conclusion 
consistently emerging from applying this methodology.       
My answer to the research question of this paper can therefore be classified as a Popperian version 
of metaphysics. When it comes to the origin of the world, the nature of the ultimate conceivable 
boundary to 'the process of the world's origin' is the distinction between rationality and irrationality. 
I agree with Popper that absolute certainty, on any matter, is an illusion. Nevertheless, as far as I can 
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currently tell, and of course provided that no contradictions are found in bion theory, I do think bion 
theory supplies an integral answer to why there is something rather than nothing: The ultimate 
reason something exists is that 'the existence of nothing' would be a logical contradiction.   
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